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Abstract
Despite popular opinion to the contrary, early scientific evidence pointed to a lack of support for 
the view that people’s actions are guided by their attitudes. One response to the lack of 
correspondence between attitudes and behaviour has been to consider the role of other factors. 
One factor that has received attention is norms – the unwritten and often unspoken rules for 
how we should behave. We present an overview of the social identity approach to attitude-
behaviour relations (Terry & Hogg, 1996), which argues that norms play a significant role in the 
attitude-behaviour relationship if and only if the norms come from salient and important 
reference groups. We will then discuss a program of research that supports this analysis and 
examines the motivations that underpin group-mediated attitude-behaviour consistency. Finally, 
we will discuss research that investigates the distinction between descriptive group norms (what 
group members do) and injunctive group norms (what group members approve of). We focus on 
how the interactions between these types of norms can inform behaviour change campaigns.  
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Why do people fail to practice what they preach? If we look around it is easy to identify 
inconsistencies between attitudes and action. For example, one might ask whether changes in 
social attitudes towards men’s housework have been accompanied by an equivalent change in 
the division of household labour. Or, to take a more recent and pressing example, why haven’t 
people’s pro-environmental attitudes translated into high levels of pro-environmental action? 
The question of why attitudes are not always translated into behaviour has been a critical 
question for social psychologists. If you cannot predict behaviour from attitudes, then attempts 
to change people’s health-related, consumer, or environmental attitudes via public education, 
propaganda, and advertising will fail to produce behaviour change. 
One response to the sometimes poor correspondence between attitudes and action is to 
argue that attitudes are not always the only predictor of behaviour. Rather, in some 
circumstances, such as when attitudes are not strong, accessible, and active, other factors, such 
as social norms – the unwritten, unspoken rules that guide our behaviour (e.g., Turner, 1991) – 
can play a significant role in translating attitudes into action. In this article, we first review 
research on social influence in the attitude-behaviour relationship before turning our attention to 
the social identity approach on attitude-behaviour relations. We then explore the social identity 
approach further, focusing on the way in which social identity factors interplay with social 
cognitive factors such as the accessibility of one’s attitudes, and highlighting the different 
motivations that underpin conformity to group norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship. 
Finally, we discuss recent research that has investigated the distinction between descriptive 
group norms (what group members do) and injunctive group norms (what group members 
approve of) and how these two aspects of group norms play a role in behaviour change 
campaigns.
Social Influence and the Attitude-Behaviour Relationship
   In the attitude-behaviour field, the study of social influence has traditionally been 
conducted using the theories of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and planned 
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behaviour (Ajzen, 1985). In these models, social influence is represented by the concept of 
subjective norm, which describes the amount of pressure that people perceive they are under 
from significant others to perform a specific behaviour. Subjective norm is seen as a key 
predictor of behavioural intentions, along with attitudes and perceptions of control over 
performance of the behaviour. Intentions, in turn, predict behaviour. 
Norms do play a role in the attitude-behaviour relationship. However, the effect of 
norms is surprisingly small. A number of reviews have indicated that subjective norms have 
little influence on people’s intentions to behave in a particular way and are the weakest 
predictor of intentions (see Armitage & Conner, 2001). The weakness of the norms-behaviour 
link even led Ajzen (1991) to conclude that personal factors (i.e., attitude and perceptions of 
control) are the primary determinants of behaviour. 
One conclusion is that norms indeed have little influence over behaviour. An alternative 
conclusion is that norms are important, but need to be conceptualized in a different way. In the 
theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour, norms are separated from attitudes – 
attitudes are “in here” (private, internalised cognitive constructs), whereas norms are “out 
there” (public external pressures). This idea of norms is quite different to that used by much of 
contemporary social psychology (e.g., Brown, 2000) and the social identity approach (e.g., 
Turner, 1991). 
The Social Identity Approach to the Attitude-Behaviour Relationship
The basic premise of the social identity approach is that belonging to a social group, 
such as a nationality or a sporting team, provides members with a definition of who one is and a 
description and prescription of what being a group member involves. Social identities are 
associated with distinctive group behaviours – behaviours that are regulated by context-specific 
group norms (see e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 2001).When individuals see themselves as belonging to 
a group and feel that being a group member is important to them, they will bring their behaviour 
into line with the perceived norms and standards of the group. People are influenced by 
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perceived group norms because they prescribe the context-specific attitudes and behaviours 
appropriate for group members. 
Drawing on a social identity analysis, Terry and Hogg (1996) argue that the lack of 
strong support for the role of norms in attitude-behaviour studies reflects problems with the way 
norms are typically conceptualized. Norms are seen as external prescriptions that influence 
behaviour, but this is inconsistent with the more widely accepted definition of norms as the 
accepted or implied rules of how group members should and do behave (e.g., Turner, 1991). 
From a social identity approach, subjective norms should have little influence on intentions. 
Group norms, on the other hand, should have a significant impact on intentions. For example, 
academics attend departmental seminars and meetings because their referent group – fellow 
academics – engage in and approve of the behaviour. As people adopt the academic identity 
they learn to conform to the group’s norms.
 In addition, within individualist models, social pressure is seen to be additive across all 
referents viewed as important to the individual. The fact that certain sources of normative 
influence will be more important for individuals in certain contexts is not considered. In 
contrast, from a social identity perspective, an individual does not average the views of family 
and colleagues to decide behaviour at home and in the office. Instead, one conforms to work 
norms regarding appropriate behaviour at work (pontificating is good, as a lecturer), and family 
norms regarding appropriate behaviour at home (pontificating is bad, as a partner).  Moreover, 
whether the perceived norm emanates from a relevant ingroup or an outgroup becomes a critical 
variable. Research confirms that ingroup norms are usually a more powerful determinant of 
behaviour than outgroup norms (e.g., Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996; Wilder, 1990; but see 
Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005 for evidence of the impact of outgroup norms). 
The norms of salient social ingroups influence willingness to engage in attitude-
consistent behaviour because the process of psychologically belonging to a group means that 
self-perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour are brought into line with the position 
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advocated by the perceived ingroup norm. Attitudes are more likely to be expressed in 
behaviour if the attitude (and associated behaviour) is normative for a social group with which 
people identify in that context. If people have positive attitudes to a behaviour, the attitude-
behaviour relationship will be strengthened when people perceive that the behaviour is 
supported by the in-group, but will be weakened when people perceive that the group does not 
support the behaviour. For example, an academic might decide to act out her positive attitudes 
to skipping committee meetings if she perceives her peers approve of the behaviour. However, 
she will inhibit, and even change, her attitudes if she perceives a norm that opposes skipping 
behaviour. 
Research has provided support for the social identity approach to attitude-behaviour 
relations. In two longitudinal tests of the theory of planned behaviour in the domains of exercise 
behaviour and sun-protection behaviour, Terry and Hogg (1996) found that the perceived norms 
of a specific and behaviourally relevant reference group (friends and peers at university) were 
positively related to students’ intentions to engage in health-related behaviours. Consistent with 
a social identity analysis, these intentions were significantly stronger among individuals who 
identified strongly with the reference group. For individuals who did not identify strongly with 
the reference group, personal factors were the strongest predictors of behavioural intention. 
Other field research has replicated this effect in studies of community recycling 
behaviour (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade, & McKimmie, in 
press), smoking (Schofield, Pattison, Hill, & Borland, 2001), binge drinking (Johnston & 
White, 2003), healthy eating (Astrom & Rise, 2001; Louis, Davies, Smith, & Terry, 2007), and 
sustainable land use (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008). When social identity is an 
important basis for self-definition, group norms shape and guide attitude-related behaviour. 
However, when social identity is not an important basis for self-definition, personal beliefs will 
determine behaviour.  
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Subsequent experiments have explored moderators and boundary conditions (see Hogg 
& Smith, 2007, for a review). These studies have used a paradigm somewhat unique to the 
attitude-behaviour field. In the basic version, attitudes towards an issue are assessed first. 
Chronic identification with the target group is assessed or contextual salience of identity is 
manipulated. Next, normative support from a self-relevant ingroup is manipulated, for example 
by showing participants bar-graphs portraying the percent of support from the in-group. In some 
studies, participants are also exposed to a series of opinion statements indicating the level of 
ingroup support or opposition to the target issue. Participants are classified as having received 
either attitude-congruent normative information (if their attitude and the normative information 
concur) or attitude-incongruent normative information. Finally, participants’ willingness to 
engage in attitude-related behaviours (e.g., signing petitions, attending rallies) and actual 
behaviour (e.g., voting behaviour) is assessed. In addition, participants’ attitudes are often re-
assessed to determine whether exposure to group norms changes attitudes, as well as immediate 
behaviour.
Across a range of attitude issues (e.g., campus issues, career choice, political issues) and 
with a range of group memberships (e.g., student identity, national identity), social identity 
researchers have demonstrated that the attitude-behaviour relationship is strengthened when 
group members are exposed to an ingroup norm supportive of their initial attitude, and is 
weakened when group members are exposed to an incongruent ingroup norm. Moreover, in 
some studies, there is evidence that participants’ attitudes have also changed to be in line with 
ingroup norms. Thus, in line with the social identity approach, group members not only display 
behaviour consistent with the perceived ingroup norm, but also internalise the content of the 
ingroup norm into their attitudes. For example, in a study examining university students’ 
littering behaviour, Wellen, Hogg, and Terry (1998) found that exposure to an attitude-
congruent ingroup norm increased engagement in attitude-consistent behaviour (in terms of 
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whether students picked up litter in a courtyard), but only when group membership was 
contextually salient (see also White, Hogg, & Terry, 2002). 
The Interplay of Cognitive and Social Identity Variables
Research in the social identity approach has also investigated the interplay of cognitive 
and social identity variables in the attitude-behaviour context. A dominant approach in the 
attitude-behaviour field is Fazio’s (1990) MODE model (Motivation and Opportunity as 
DEterminants of mode of behavioural decision-making), which distinguishes two different 
processes through which attitudes can guide behaviour: a spontaneous process and a 
deliberative process. Under conditions of low motivation and opportunity, links between 
attitudes and behaviour arise as the result of spontaneous processing and are driven by the 
extent to which the attitude is salient, or accessible, in memory. Under conditions of high 
motivation and opportunity, attitude-behaviour links result from deliberative processing in 
which a range of factors, such as norms, are considered.
According to the MODE model, norms should influence behaviour most strongly under 
deliberative processing conditions and attitude accessibility should be the primary determinant 
of behaviour under spontaneous processing conditions. In contrast, the social identity approach 
argues that ingroup norms should influence behaviour in all processing conditions. This is 
because when group membership is salient, perceived group norms become accessible and 
relevant guides to behaviour. 
Smith and Terry (2003) conducted two experiments that investigated the impact of both 
cognitive (attitude accessibility, mode of behavioural decision-making) and social identity 
(ingroup norms, identification) factors on attitude-behaviour consistency. In both studies, 
attitude accessibility was manipulated using a computerised version of the repeated expression 
technique (Powell & Fazio, 1984), in which repeated expression of one’s attitude towards an 
issue heightens the accessibility of the attitude relative to a no-expression condition. Mode of 
behavioural decision-making was manipulated by inducing either a positive or neutral mood 
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(reasoned to correspond to spontaneous and deliberative processing respectively; see Bless, 
Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990) or by placing people under high time pressure or low time 
pressure (reasoned to correspond to spontaneous and deliberative processing respectively; see 
Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990). Ingroup normative support was manipulated with the bargraphs 
and opinions statements described previously and identification was assessed with a standard 
scale (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993). At the conclusion of the studies, participants 
expressed their willingness to engage in attitude-consistent actions (e.g., signing petitions) and 
were give the opportunity to engage in attitude-consistent behaviour (e.g., volunteering time to 
an action group on the issue).
Across both studies, and contrary to the MODE model, higher levels of attitude 
accessibility were not associated with greater attitude-behaviour consistency and the effects of 
attitude accessibility did not vary under spontaneous and deliberative conditions. Rather, 
ingroup norms influenced attitude-behaviour consistency in both spontaneous and deliberative 
decision-making modes. What is more, the effect of ingroup norms was stronger for high 
identifiers than low identifiers under deliberative decision-making conditions, consistent with a 
social identity analysis. Individuals for whom the group is an important basis for self-definition 
should be motivated to consider group norms carefully (see also Forgas & Fiedler, 1996), but 
they may only have the ability to do so when conditions favour deliberative processing. Thus, 
social factors, such as the salience and importance of a social identity and its norms, may have 
more impact on the attitude-behaviour relationship than purely cognitive factors.
Motivational Considerations – Uncertainty Reduction
Social identity research has also paid attention to the motivations underlying group-
mediated behaviour in the attitude-behaviour context. One motivation that has been proposed is 
uncertainty reduction. According to this model Hogg (2000, 2007), uncertainty about our 
attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and perceptions, as well as about our selves and our social world, is 
aversive. As a result, uncertainty often motivates behaviour aimed at creating certainty, 
9
including identification with relevant reference groups. In the attitude-behaviour context, 
uncertainty is proposed to create a predisposition to be influenced because one way to reduce 
uncertainty is to conform to the perceived norms of a relevant reference group and that define 
one’s attitudes and behaviours.
The importance of uncertainty as a motive for behaviour is not a novel idea in social 
psychology. Uncertainty caused by either stimulus ambiguity (e.g., Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1936) or 
by disagreement on judgemental and perceptual tasks (e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, 
Hogg, & Turner, 1990; McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993) has been found to produce 
shifts in attitudes and behaviour in line with perceived norms. However, the analysis of 
uncertainty has focused on its role in producing conformity out of disagreement over attitudinal 
or perceptual judgements – attitudinal uncertainty – rather than on the effect of generalised 
feelings of uncertainty about the self, identity, and the world in general – self-relevant 
uncertainty. 
Smith, Hogg, Martin, and Terry (2007) conducted two studies to examine the impact of 
self-relevant uncertainty on conformity to group norms in the attitude-behaviour context. In 
both studies, uncertainty was manipulated using a deliberative mindset manipulation that 
previous research had found was successful in creating uncertainty (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, 
& Spencer, 2001). In this manipulation, people are asked to think about an unresolved dilemma 
in their own life (high uncertainty) or in the life of a friend (low uncertainty). In Study 1, 
participants were exposed to either an attitude-congruent or an attitude-incongruent group norm. 
In Study 2, participants were exposed to either a congruent, incongruent, or ambiguous group 
norm. The key outcome was whether participants intended to behave in an attitude-consistent 
manner (i.e., attitude-intention consistency). However, change in attitude certainty was assessed 
in Study 2 to see whether the effects of self-relevant uncertainty emerged even after changes in 
attitude certainty (potentially caused by exposure to information that others do not agree with 
you) had been taken into account.  
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Across both studies, as predicted, uncertainty and normative support interacted to 
influence attitude-intention consistency. Individuals who felt uncertain responded to the content 
of the ingroup norm, reducing displays of attitude-intention consistency when exposed to 
information that the group disagreed with their position. In contrast, the intentions of those who 
felt certain were not influenced by the ingroup norm. Moreover, self-relevant uncertainty 
continued to influence group-mediated conformity even when changes in attitude certainty were 
controlled. These results suggest that a desire to resolve uncertainty may underpin group-
mediated behaviour in the attitude-behaviour relationship.
Motivational Considerations – Strategic Self-Presentation
In addition to satisfying an uncertainty-related motive, group members may also 
conform to group norms for strategic self-presentation reasons. In recent years, social identity 
researchers have begun to examine the strategic nature of group-mediated behaviour by 
incorporating insights from the self-presentation perspective – specifically, the idea that 
individuals are aware of, and modify their behaviour for, their current audience. Early 
formulations of referent informational influence (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987) argue that group 
members will automatically follow group norms when group membership is salient.  However, 
we argue that group members may use displays of group behaviour in a strategic way, deciding 
if and when to adopt and enact the norms of group in order to achieve desired goals, such as 
positive evaluations from others, in a given context (see also Louis & Taylor, 2002; Louis et al., 
2004, 2005). 
Drawing on analyses of the strategic expression of social identity (e.g., Reicher, Spears, 
& Postmes, 1995), Smith and colleagues (Smith, Terry, & Hogg, 2006, 2007) have shown that 
strategic concerns, such as those associated with accountability to particular audiences, 
influence conformity to group norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship. In two experiments, 
Smith et al. (2007) examined levels of group-mediated attitude-behaviour consistency in 
unaccountable and accountable conditions. Response context was manipulated prior to the 
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assessment of the attitude-related outcomes. In the ingroup accountable condition, participants 
were led to expect a group discussion in which they would be expected to disclose and justify 
their behavioural decisions. In the anonymous (or not accountable) condition, participants 
expected a group discussion on reasons for studying psychology.
Across both experiments, individuals for whom the group was not important (either 
contextually or chronically) were more inclined to follow ingroup norms when they were 
accountable to the ingroup than when they were not accountable. These individuals may have 
been driven by more extrinsic, self-presentational concerns, such as a desire for positive 
evaluation (see also Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). In contrast, individuals for whom the group was 
important were more likely to follow ingroup norms when they were not accountable than when 
they were accountable, suggesting that accountability does not increase group behaviour when 
individuals are intrinsically motivated to engage in group behaviour. That is, in line with self-
determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), individuals who are intrinsically (or internally) 
motivated to engage in particular courses of action, such as high identifiers engaging in group 
behaviour, are more likely to display such behaviour when not accountable because these 
displays cannot be attributed to external constraints (such as self-presentation concerns 
associated with accountability) and, as a result, are more diagnostic of group loyalty. These 
results extend past research on the social identity approach to attitude-behaviour relations by 
highlighting the power of group norms to influence the behaviour of all group members, albeit 
under different circumstances and perhaps for different reasons.
The Interplay of Descriptive and Injunctive Group Norms
An alternative approach to the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour context has been 
to consider additional sources of social influence. Rather than seeing norms as a unitary 
construct, Cialdini and his colleagues (1990, 1991) have argued that the common definition of 
norms reflects two components: conceptions of what people should do and of what people 
actually do. Injunctive norms reflect perceptions of what most others approve or disapprove of, 
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and motivate action because of the social rewards and punishments associated with performance 
of the behaviour. Descriptive norms reflect the perception of whether or not other people 
actually perform the behaviour, and motivate action by providing information about what 
behaviours are effective or adaptive in a particular context. 
The utility of the distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms has received 
extensive support from both correlational (see Rivis & Sheeran, 2003, for a review) and 
experimental research (see Cialdini, 2003, for a review). Both descriptive and injunctive norms 
independently influence behaviour, and the impact of norms appears strongest when these 
norms are consistent with each other (e.g., Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 
2007).
Despite the contributions of both approaches, there have been few attempts to integrate 
the social identity and norm focus perspectives. In the social identity approach, norms are seen 
to have both descriptive and injunctive properties – group norms provide information about 
how group members should and do behave. In its empirical treatment of norms, however, social 
identity research has failed to distinguish the descriptive and injunctive aspects of group norms. 
In correlational research, the two aspects are not always empirically distinct and are usually 
collapsed into a single averaged measure (e.g., Terry et al., 1999; but see Norman, Clark, & 
Walker, 2006). In experimental research, studies have typically manipulated either the 
descriptive component (e.g., White et al., 2002) or the injunctive component (e.g., Terry et al., 
2000).  
Research on the norm focus approach has typically manipulated the salience of either 
injunctive or descriptive norms (see Cialdini et al., 1991), or has held the salience of the 
descriptive norm constant while the salience of the injunctive norm has been varied. The two 
types of norm have rarely been manipulated orthogonally. Although what is usually done and 
what is usually approved are frequently the same, this is not always the case. Sometimes a 
department may have an injunctive norm in favour of attending committee meetings, but the 
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descriptive norm is that a majority of people skip the meetings. Similarly, a widespread 
descriptive norm of energy wastage may belie a population’s increasingly intense injunctive 
norm in favour of conservation. The relationships and connections among the two types of 
norms, and the possibility that these norms will interact to influence behaviour, have been 
neglected. It is of theoretical as well as applied concern that it is difficult to predict which 
norms will influence behaviour when incompatible descriptive and injunctive norms apply in a 
given situation.  
To address this research question, Smith and Louis (in press) conducted two 
experiments that tested the relative impact of descriptive and injunctive group norms on 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviour. It is important to note that descriptive and injunctive norms 
were manipulated to be equivalent in these studies. In past research, sometimes injunctive 
norms are presented as more abstract (environmental concerns in general) and descriptive 
norms more concrete (littering behaviour in the parking lot). In addition, sometimes one type of 
norm is presented from one group (the authorities have put up a sign banning littering) whereas 
the other norm is presented from a different group (students at your campus have apparently 
littered). These inconsistencies make it hard to interpret differences in the effects of injunctive 
and descriptive norms in past research. In our study, descriptive norms reflected the number of 
people in an ingroup (university students) who, as a rule, do or do not engage in the target 
behaviour. Similarly, injunctive norms reflected the number of ingroup members who, as a rule, 
approve or disapprove of engaging in the target behaviour (cf. Cialdini et al., 1990).  
By considering the injunctive and descriptive norms at the same level of abstraction and 
from the same source, we can hope to identify their unique and interactive effects, so that in 
future research the impact of differing sources and levels of abstraction can be explored without 
confounds. Specifically, an aim of the research was to test the forms of the possible interactions 
between injunctive and descriptive norms. Is the combination of supportive descriptive and 
injunctive norms disproportionately positive and facilitating, leading to increased engagement 
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in the behaviour, while the combination of non-supportive descriptive and injunctive norms is 
disproportionately negative and inhibiting, leading to decreased engagement in the behaviour? 
And what is the impact of incompatible or clashing descriptive and injunctive group norms: 
Does such inconsistency facilitate or inhibit engagement in the behaviour?
In both studies, university students’ attitudes towards campus issues were obtained, the 
descriptive and injunctive group norms were manipulated, and participants’ post-manipulation 
attitudes, behavioural willingness, and behaviour were assessed. In Study 1, the issue was the 
introduction of full-fee places for undergraduates. This was a contentious initiative at the time 
and an issue on which students were particularly engaged and active, as evidenced by large 
student protests on the campus where the research was conducted. In Study 2, the issue was the 
introduction of comprehensive examinations, an issue that was not under serious consideration 
and would not have been particularly salient for students. 
Descriptive and injunctive group norms did interact to influence group members’ 
attitudes, behavioural willingness, and behaviour. Exposure to supportive injunctive and 
descriptive group norms was associated with high levels of attitude-consistent responding 
whereas exposure to non-supportive injunctive and descriptive group norms was associated 
with low levels of attitude-consistent responding. But what happened when the descriptive and 
injunctive norms clashed? The pattern of this interaction varied across the two experiments. In 
Study 1, where the issue was very salient and involving, a high level of attitude-consistent 
responding was observed for participants who were exposed to a supportive injunctive norm but 
a non-supportive descriptive norm. Thus, when the group does not appear to practise what it 
preaches, this discrepancy can be motivating, leading group members to act, and to reduce the 
discrepancy for their group. In Study 2, however, where the issue was not salient and involving, 
any inconsistency between the injunctive and descriptive norm was associated with low levels 
of attitude-consistent responding. Indeed, exposure to inconsistency between the injunctive and 
descriptive norm was equivalent to exposure to non-supportive descriptive and injunctive group 
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norms. Thus, when the issue is not important and relevant and people are predisposed to 
passivity, supportive injunctive and descriptive norms may be needed to stimulate action; any 
inconsistency may promote inaction. 
These experiments represent the first attempt to integrate the social identity approach 
and the norm focus approach to the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship. This 
research highlights the importance of considering both descriptive and injunctive group norms 
and the need to attend to the combined effects of these two types of norms. But, this research 
raises the important question of whether inconsistency between injunctive and descriptive 
norms is a motivating or de-motivating force. Is it the case that such inconsistency is perceived 
as hypocrisy, leading to behaviour aimed at restoring a balance between the group ideal (i.e., the 
injunctive norm) and current group behaviour (i.e., the descriptive norm)? Or is it the case that 
such inconsistency leads group members to perceive that practising what one preaches is not an 
important rule for the group (i.e., a “meta-norm” of inconsistency – see McKimmie et al., 
2003). One factor that influences this outcome is the importance of the issue for the group. 
Future research should examine other factors that might play a role in this process – such as 
level of identification with the group – and examine how attributions for inconsistency 
influence the level of group-normative behaviour.
Normative Influence and Behaviour Change
Norms play a key role in the attitude-behaviour relationship. But how can we harness 
the power of norms to produce positive behaviour change? Everyone is targeted by normative 
messages from sources such as governments, religious groups, businesses, and friends, about 
behaviour from deodorant usage to dieting to drinking. Yet people often ignore these normative 
messages. For example, obesity levels in developed nations continue to grow, despite costly 
government campaigns to change perceptions of appropriate diet and exercise. More seriously, 
sometimes campaigns to change peoples’ norms even increase the problem that they are trying 
to solve. For example, college students targeted with campaigns designed to promote positive 
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norms about alcohol consumption are equally or even more likely to engage in problematic 
alcohol behaviour than college students not exposed to such campaigns (see e.g., Wechsler et 
al., 2003). What’s going wrong?
Cialdini (2003) has argued that the failure of normative messages to produce change can 
be attributed to the way in which descriptive norm information is presented. Many behaviour 
change campaigns attempt to mobilise action against problem behaviour by depicting it as 
regrettably frequent. However, hidden within the message “please don’t engage in this 
behaviour because many people are doing this undesirable action” is the message “many people 
are doing this undesirable action”. If these messages lead people to infer a high prevalence of 
the problem behaviour, campaigns may not only fail, but actually be counterproductive. For 
example, a sign asking people not to take petrified wood from a U.S. National Park because 
many past visitors had taken wood actually increased the level of environmental theft (Cialdini 
et al., 2006). However, it is possible to avoid these descriptive norm backlash effects. For 
example, feedback on the low levels of recycling behaviour within a community subsequently 
increased levels of recycling behaviour engaged in by members of that community (Schultz, 
1998).
One solution to this problem might be to focus instead on the injunctive norm (see 
Blanton, Koblitz, & McCaul, 2008). Indeed, Schultz et al. (2007) found that including 
information about whether other people approved of a behaviour prevented backlash effects 
associated with the provision of descriptive norm information. However, injunctive norms may 
also backfire. Communicating an injunctive norm against an action (e.g., “You shouldn’t do 
drugs”) may lead people to infer a descriptive norm in favour of the action (“Many people must 
be doing drugs otherwise you wouldn’t go to the trouble of telling me this”), leading to more 
engagement in the undesired behaviour. The ways in which injunctive norms might backfire, 
however, have not been investigated. To understand backlash effects, it is critical to examine the 
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psychological processes that underpin the effects of descriptive and injunctive norms and to 
examine how these two types of norms interact to influence behaviour. 
In our most recent research, we have attempted to examine the inferences people draw 
from normative messages and how these inferences influence the success of such messages. In 
one experiment, Louis and Smith (2007) exposed university students to messages that the 
university was planning to run a campaign on sun protection (half did not receive this message) 
and/or that the vast majority of their fellow students (i.e., the ingroup) approved of sun 
protection behaviour (half did not receive this message). We expected that in the absence of 
information about the ingroup injunctive norm, simply hearing that a campaign targeting the 
ingroup was planned would lead people to infer that the desired behaviour was uncommon. This 
perception of a negative descriptive norm would, in turn, lead to decreased engagement in the 
desired behaviour. This is exactly what was found: students told that the university was 
planning a ‘sun-smart’ campaign inferred that other students did not strongly approve of, and 
did not really engage in, sun protection behaviour. Moreover, when students learned about the 
planned campaign, but were not given information about the ingroup’s position, the campaign 
information had no positive effects, and even tended to produce lower levels of sun-protection 
intentions and behaviour. This did not occur when people were also given information that the 
ingroup approved of sun protection behaviour. 
These results highlight three key points. First, it is critical to assess how exposure to one 
type of norm (descriptive or injunctive) influences perceptions of the other type of norm. 
Previous research has demonstrated the power of norms, but has failed to examine the 
underlying psychological processes systematically. Second, it is important to consider the 
interactions between injunctive and descriptive norms. Cialdini (2003) has argued that norms 
will be most effective when there is consistency between the message of the descriptive and 
injunctive norm. However, in contexts where one is trying to change behaviour or promote new 
behaviours, these messages are often not aligned (e.g., “we should use energy efficient light 
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bulbs because we’re not currently using them”). It is therefore vital to examine the way in 
which people respond to these inconsistencies (see Smith & Louis, in press). 
Finally, the source of the normative message should not be overlooked. Behaviour 
change messages are likely to emanate from sources that people might consider to be outgroups 
(e.g., governments, international bodies) rather than ingroups. Source effects have not been 
considered in past research. However, the social identity approach, and the work by Louis and 
Smith (2007), suggests that norms and messages that emanate from a relevant ingroup will be 
more effective than those that emanate from a perceived outgroup. In addition, exposure to 
behaviour change messages in the absence of information about what is valued by the ingroup 
(as is often the case in behaviour change campaigns) might even increase the salience of the 
intergroup distinctions between the ingroup and the source, thereby reducing the effectiveness 
of the message. It is important to investigate source effects and strategies that behaviour change 
agents can employ to overcome barriers associated with perceived group membership. Attention 
to the identity politics of campaigns for behaviour change is, we believe, vital. Our current work 
addresses these issues.
Concluding Comments
The research reviewed in this article highlights the way in which the social identity 
approach can provide an integrative analysis of the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour 
context. This research shows that group norms are important in the link between attitudes and 
action, demonstrates when group norms will lead to attitude-behaviour correspondence, and 
also provides insights into why people conform to group norms in this context. 
A number of challenges do remain. One challenge is to apply the social identity analysis 
more consistently to issues of social concern, such as health behaviours, environmental 
behaviours, and prejudice and discrimination and to use the insights gained from this work to 
inform behaviour change interventions. Some advances are being made in these areas (e.g., 
Fielding et al., 2008; Terry, Hogg, & Blackwood, 2001), but more research is needed to realise 
19
the social and theoretical impacts of this approach. Continued research attention is vital: these 
issues lie at the heart of social psychology’s quest to understand how the perceived beliefs, 
feelings, and actions of those around us influence our own thoughts, emotions, and behaviours.  
20
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